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There is a reasonable consensus that trade policy has played
an important role in Brazilian industrial development (cf. Tyler,
1976; Tavares, 1982, among others). In the 1950s it was used to
stimulate the substitution of imported consumer goods. Subse-
quently - during the 1960s - policy shifted to promoting manu-
factured exports, though without reducing the levels of protec-
tion afforded to import-substituting industries established pre-
viously (basically the automotive and industrial-infrastructure
sectors; Skidmore, 1975). In 1957 an ad-valorem tariff system was
established to provide a margin of protection against outside
competition consistent with the import-substitution process then
underway. By the late 1960s, a number of measures ensured the
competitiveness of Brazilian manufactured goods abroad (IPI and
ICM tax credits, income tax exemption on export earnings, pre-
ferential interest rates, foreign-exchange administration favour-
able to exports, etc.). Owing to this strategy production in
some industries became highly concentrated. Domestic price con-
trols were established jointly with production subsidies (sub-
sidized credit from BNDES, preferential interest rates and tax
exemptions awarded by the CDI for Brazilian-ownership programs
and others) in order to guarantee the expansion of domestic sales
and allow economies of scale to be realized. Despite some argu-
ments about inconsistencies in the use of trade policy during
this period, the economic development strategy was undeniably
successful: An extensive and rather diversified industrial
structure was created, and manufactured products currently make
up more than 50 per cent of Brazilian exports.
The approach taken in this study is primarily to evaluate
the protection given to industry during the first half of the
1980s. It therefore expands upon Tyler (1983) who evaluated the
protection of Brazilian industry by comparing international pri-
ces for 1980-81. He demonstrated the inappropriateness of using
legal tariff rates for measuring levels of protection in Brazil,
Carvalho and Haddad (1980) summarize studies that estimate the
effects of trade policy on Brazilian export performance during
the 1960s and the mid-1970s.and concluded that substantial allocational benefits could be
obtained if effective protection rates were made uniform. More-
over, a reduction of the anti-export bias would lead to an in-
crease in exports with favourable distributive implications
(greater use of unskilled labour and alleviation of poverty).
In this paper we have applied a methodology similar to
Tyler's, based on 1985 prices. Our results reinforce Tyler's
arguments about excessive protection given to certain sectors of
Brazilian industry, though to a lesser degree than in 1980-81.
Similarly, the gradual phasing out of certain export promotion
schemes during the first half of the 1980s has led to a pro-
nounced anti-export bias in some industries.
Today the need to modernize industry in order to ensure
Brazil's integration into the world economy is being emphasized.
The New Industrial Policy and the tariff reform are intended to
spur productive efficiency through foreign competition and
technological progress. Trade policy needs to be reformulated
along these lines.
This study is structured as follows: The second chapter
evaluates legal tariffs and average tariff collections for the
years 1975, 1980 and 1985. For 1985, the differential between
domestic and foreign prices is used to quantify the nominal and
effective protection of Brazilian industry as well as tariff
redundancy. Export incentives in 1980-85 are described and incen-
tive rates calculated in Chapter 3. The final chapter presents
conclusions and policy recommendations.
2. IMPORT POLICY
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter we analyze the protection of manufacturing
industry against foreign competition though tariffs and non-
tariff barriers in 1975, 1980 and 1985. This involves empirical
problems since it is not clear whether legal or actual tariffs
(the ratio between import duty paid and import value) are themost appropriate measure of protection. Furthermore, non-tariff
barriers (NTB) in Brazil have been a protection tool at least as
effective as tariffs. However, it is difficult to assess their
importance because their impact on trade flows depends on the
supply situation in each industry (Deardorf and Stern, 1985). The
estimates for 1985 are particularly useful because they are based
on a comparison between domestic and international prices and
therefore provide an accurate estimate of the combined effect of
tariffs and NTBs.
2.2. Price Comparisons
International price comparisons have been used in several
empirical studies on foreign trade and industrial organization.
From the standpoint of international trade theories, studies
traditionally start from the assumption that for similar products
domestic prices are the same as international ones (Law of One
Price). The validity of this principle is generally based on the
prior acceptance of perfect competition in the international
market, and is therefore consistent with the restrictive
assumption of a small country. Recent open economy macroeconomics
requires compatibility with the purchasing power parity theorem
for the Law of One Price to hold, suggesting that price changes
in a country be offset by shifts in the exchange rate.
Although no consensus has yet been established on the valid-
ity of the purchasing power parity theorem, and recent studies in
other countries point to the possibility of imperfect competition
in international markets (Hazlediner, 1980), the use of price
comparisons has relied upon the notion that the Law of One Price
2
is valid. This methodology has also been used in other studies
as a measure of the international competitiveness of individual
industries.
This occurs due to tariff exemptions and reductions.
2
See in particular Nambiar (1983), Greenhill and Herbolzheimer
(1980), and Richardson (1978).
De Vries (1972), Kravis and Lipsey (1971), Weinblatt and
Zilberfarb (1981).The main reason for the widespread use of price comparisons
is that knowledge about the relationship between national and
international prices can be extremely important in the formula-
tion of economic policies, whether or not the law of one price
prevails. The reason is that prices reflect institutional in-
fluences for every country involved in trade, in addition to the
usual impact of the balance between commodity supply and demand.
Particularly with regard to industrial policy the estimated
ratios between internal and external prices are useful for de-
termining the advantages obtained by individual industries
through protection against foreign competition.
In Brazil price differentials have only been used as of
late. Due to the lack of price data, earlier studies only dealt
2
with protection through tariffs. The first studies on the pro-
tection of Brazilian industry based on price comparisons are
those by Tyler (1983) and Braga et al. (1987). In the case of
Brazil, this approach is important due to the difference between
legal tariffs and actual tariff collections.
This situation results from the wide variety of tariff
exemptions and rebates given to imported products used in pri-
ority projects involving bilateral cooperation and regional de-
velopment (SUDAM, SUDENE and others), as well as capital good
imports according to fixed political guidelines (increasing the
degree of national ownership, CDI, BEFIEX, drawback and others).
As an illustration, in 1985 the average actual tariff collection
rate for all manufacturing was 6 per cent, while the legal rate
was 22 per cent. The usefulness of tariffs (legal or actual) in
studies on protectionism is therefore limited; for this reason,
results are somewhat neglected by policy makers.
Tyler (1983); Braga et.al. (1987) compare the estimates of
effective protection in previous studies with those based on
price differentials.
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Bergsman and Malan (1971), Neuhaus and Lobato (1971), Kume and
Rosa (1981), Braga and Guimaraes (1982).
Several studies treat this aspect of Brazilian trade policy and
summarize the difficulties in estimating the real degree of
protection for the domestic economy resulting from tariffs. Of
particular interest is Guimaraes (1986).There are three other no less important characteristics that
favour the use of international price comparisons. The first is
that part of the tariff may be redundant, meaning that the inter-
national price plus legal tariff exceeds the domestic price.
Since the tariff structure is designed largely in response to
pressures from groups demanding protection, it is reasonable to
assume that in some cases tariffs lose their allocational func-
tion with time. The second characteristic is that control of
imports has recently also consisted of non-tariff instruments:
prohibited imports, protected markets (the 'market reserve', for
example in data-processing), the Law of the National Similar, Fi-
nancial Operations Tax (IOF), and other instruments that are
difficult to quantify (Guimaraes, 1987, Moreira and Araujo,
1984). The third characteristic is that an industry can benefit
from favourable domestic prices while at the same time having its
profitability affected by other policies. Although there are no
empirical calculations of the degree of functional imbalance be-
tween industrial and foreign trade policy in Brazil, there is a
certain consensus in business and academic circles in this re-
gard.
With this line of reasoning, the basic idea contained in
studies by Tyler (1983) and Braga et al. (1987) is that the dif-
ferences between internal and external prices for similar prod-
ucts quoted during the same period indicate the implicit nominal
protection of Brazilian products. The ad-valorem rate obtained
from the price differentials can be interpreted as an implicit
tariff, which is entirely different from the one provided by law
or from the actual tariff applied, because it incorporates the
whole gamut of policies that are reflected in prices.
Tyler's formula is as follows:
PD.
TimPj










= (PW. + CF.) r (21
= domestic price for manufacturer, FOB plant,
of product j, excluding IPI and ICM;
= import price (CIF) of product j, in Cruzados;
= "international price" of tradeable product j,
FOB at some reference point of origin, in
foreign currency;
= freight and insurance, from reference point of
origin to Brazilian entry port, in foreign
currency; and
= official exchange rate, defined as Cruzados
per unit of foreign currency.
This approach is completely in accordance with the law of
one price. In addition, Tyler extends the basic formula for the
implicit tariff formula to incorporate direct subsidies to pro-
duction (s), obtaining a more generalized measure of implicit




PD (1 + S) - 1
PMJ (3)
Braga et al. (1987) follow the same development as Tyler
with one fundamental conceptual distinction: the FOB price of
Brazilian exports is used as the international price (PW.*),
» 3
excluding transportation costs and reinforcing the notion that
export incentives and subsidies are incorporated into the domes-
tic price. They therefore dispense with the calculation of im-
plicit nominal protection (P. .) since they assume that the
effects of export promotion and the subsidization of domestic
activity are reflected in price formation.
In addition, the findings by Tyler (1983) and Braga et al.
(1987) should be compared with caution because the latter, use thesophisticated method to calculate effective protection, unlike
Tyler. Moreover, Braga's results have to be adjusted to the CIF
price base for a comparison with tariff rates, because this is
the basis on which customs duties are calculated. The adjustment
of the price vector should therefore be as follows:
T =
 J — 1 (A)
impj PW. r (1 + N.)
 K '
N. is the ad-valorem rate of international shipment costs that
will result * in the formation of domestic prices (cf. Braga &
Guimaraes, 1982), once PW is defined as the border price (fob).
On the basis of these arguments the rates of nominal and
effective implicit protection have been (re)calculated using the
prices available for 1985 from IPEA/INPES. Unfortunately our
figures are not strictly comparable to those of Braga et al.
(1987) for at least two reasons. We have used the traditional
rather than the sophisticated method of effective protection
estimation, and the aggregation of price differentials was based
on the study made by FUNCEX and IPEA in 1987 to harmonize indus-
trial and trade classification systems.
2.3. Construction of Variables
a) Implicit Nominal Protection
The main problem in obtaining estimates of implicit nominal
protection lies in the homogeneity requirement for the products
to be included in the international price comparison. This is
confirmed by UN (1961) which established substantial differences
between the prices of (groups of) commodities at the 4 and 5
digit-level of the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) when exported by different countries. One reason for this
result is (as stated) the need to classify essentially different
products, though with similar physical characteristics, under the
same SITC heading.
Lee (1982) and Braga et al. (1987) summarize the methodology of
this sophisticated calculation method for effective protection.In this study the nominal protection vector is based on 1710
pairs of prices reported by manufacturers, who are the most re-
liable source for the prices of their products sold in different
markets, ensuring product homogeneity. We have therefore con-
structed 1710 implicit nominal protection rates and have grouped
them according to the NBM product classification into 790 8-digit
items, which is the finest product breakdown for this classifica-
tion. It was therefore possible to make these (groups of) prod-
ucts consistent with the 105 sectors of the FIBGE Intersectoral
Relations Matrix (1975), and to express nominal implicit protec-
2
tion for these sectors (j) through simple averages.
In formal terms, the implicit nominal tariff vector has been
constructed at product level (i) as follows:




PDj. = price, FOB plant, received by producer net of
1 IPI and ICM, quoted in Cruzeiros on June 1,
1985, for product i of sector j;
r = official Cruzeiro/dollar exchange rate on
June 1, 1985;
*j
PW. = international price of product i approximated
by FOB export price in US dollars, quoted on
June 1, 1985, for sector j;
N. = base rate of shipping cost for product i,
sector j.
The 1710 pairs of prices that form implicit nominal pro-
tection rates for the 105 industrial sectors have been obtained
for internationally tradeable products, to ensure their useful-
ness in calculating effective protection.
The set of price differentials used by Tyler (1983) has a dif-
ferent price appropriation system.
2
Domestic prices of tradeable products, cattle and farm goods
have been considered as highly sensitive to international pri-
ces quoted on the main commodities exchanges abroad. This con-
sideration is backed up by evidence that these prices vary
considerably in view of the inelastic offer of these products.b) Tariff Protection
The actual tariff vector for the years 1975, 1980 and 1985
is calculated as the ad-valorem rate for the import duty actually
paid, for contracting the imported commodity. In addition, we
provide a legal tariff vector taken from rates as given in
Brazilian Customs Duties (TAB) for almost 11000 items and for the
same years. The construction of this vector started with the
calculation of the simple average for each industrial sector,
which were then weighted on the basis of 1975 output for
estimates by industry.
c) Shipping Costs
The ad valorum rate for shipping costs (N) has been computed
as the proportional increase of the domestic price:
CIF cost - FOB cost
N
 = FOB cost
 (5
)
Estimates of shipping costs have been obtained for trade-
ables (8-digit level of NBM) from two different sources. Special
consideration was initially given to shipping cost estimates
furnished by companies reporting on prices that were part of the
IPEA/INPES study. For those products with no such data available,
an estimate has been made by means of the difference between the
CIF and FOB costs as given in the Brazilian Foreign Trade Year-
book (CACEX, 1985).
1
2.4 Changes in Protection 1975-1985
Import policy as part of the global economic development
strategy has undergone significant modifications. Foremost among
This measurement was originally suggested by Beckerman (1956)
and has been used in a number of empirical studies on shipping
cost. By construction the two sources of data include freight
and insurance for internationally tradeable commodities. For
Brazil, this yardstick was used by Braga & Guimaraes (1982) to
compute overall effective protection.10
them has been the ad-valorem tariff structure created in 1957 and
constantly changed over the years. Brazilian government activi-
ties have contributed to these changes. Since the mid-1960s' it
has expanded its role in the economy and now is responsible for
some 70 per cent of gross capital formation. In the 1970s the
government began an ambitious investment program for the domestic
production of basic raw materials and capital goods.
As part of this strategy tariffs for a number of inputs
were raised by as much as 100 per cent during 1974-75. Subse-
quently, an advance deposit for a 360-day period equal to the
value of imports was created, and lasted until 1979. During this
time import controls were tightened by means of non-tariff
barriers. Expectations were that in view of the economic vul-
nerability caused by the oil crisis the economy would come to
depend less on a group of goods produced abroad for which intern-
ational prices were rising.
Along this line of reasoning. Table 1 contains evidence on
tariff policy for 1975, 1980 and 1985. The averages for each
industry have been weighted by actual imports to show the rele-
vance of special regimes that provide for tariff exemptions or
reductions. The ratio between the legal and actual tariffs was
reasonably constant in manufacturing (actual tariffs at 65 to 70
per cent of legal tariffs). Such figures suggest a certain rigid-
ity of access to the special arrangements and show that legal
tariff reductions during the period have lead to similar reduc-
tions in the actual tariff. The greatest differences between
legal and actual tariffs normally occurred in the area of metal-
lurgy, mechanical equipment, transport equipment, wood products,
furniture, leather goods, clothing and footwear and food. It is
interesting to observe that in regard to such goods with a high
social rate of return, the difference between the legal and
actual tariff is generally high, favoring the actual tariff in
detriment to the legal one.
Moldau (1986) estimates the cost of domestic resources for
export by industrial sector.11




Item - FIBGE Legal Actual Diff. Legal Actual Diff. Legal Actual Diff.
Non-metallic Minerals 36.46 14.95 21.51 46.38 28.57 17.81 35.00 23.07 11.93
Metallurgy 31.48 3.73 27.75 35.45 3.97 31.48 23.82 3.49 25.33
Mechanical Equipment 37.14 19.87 17.27 51.64 29.74 21.90 50.26 15.65 34.61
Electrical Equipment 42.89 26.06 16.83 60.15 23.93 36.22 52.27 23.42 28.85
Transport Equipment 44.25 11.40 32.85 66.13 7.13 59.00 59.24 3.29 55.95
Wood Products 58.26 11.16 47.10 31.02 10.68 80.34 48.00 5.65 42.35
Furniture 45.23 16.73 28.50 54.15 37.09 17.06 50.72 26.28 24.44
Paper 31.22 10.52 20.70 41.91 22.14 19.77 41.19 26.70 14.49
Rubber Products 29.86 18.75 11.11 29.50 21.07 8.43 29.20 9.04 20.16
Leather Product 47.77 11.89 35.88 53.22 14.97 38.25 46.94 10.90 36.04
Chemicals 7.66 2.21 5.45 6.21 2.04 4.17 4.49 2.48 2.01
Pharmaceuticals 22.24 16.04 6.20 29.01 20.82 8.19 28.77 22.85 5.92
Perfumes, Soaps 36.13 20.26 15.87 49.87 17.83 32.04 42.20 22.83 19.37
Plastics 42.78 20.29 22.49 44.67 23.14 21.53 43.71 23.88 19.83
Textiles 34.79 12.28 22.51 44.13 21.93 22.20 44.84 16.61 28.23
Clothing, Footwear 75.58 12.29 63.29 91.64 15.62 76.02 75.33 3.10 72.23
Food 52.07 11.65 40.42 44.67 7.66 37.01 35.88 6.50 29.38
Beverages 38.64 30.47 8.17 29.11 16.32 12.79 22.59 13.82 8.77
Tobacco Products 47.72 39.25 8.47 52.60 48.20 4.40 34.75 33.63 1.12
Printing 30.33 12.03 18.30 19.78 4.84 14.94 22.37 5.54 16.83
Other Industry 36.24 21.93 14.31 39.71 25.64 14.07 34.99 12.89 22.10
Manufacturing 24.32 8.46 15.86 21.08 6.59 14.49 18.39 5.68 12.717
Other 42.88 9.17 33.71 39.43 7.05 32.38 39.07 6.17 32.90
Total 28.32 8.62 19.69 24.65 6.68 17.97 22.15 5.77 16.38
Averages weighted by Import Value.
Source: Brazilian Foreign Trade Yearbook: CACEX Imports, 1975-
1980-198512
It is also important to note that tariff exemptions and
reductions require bureaucratic procedures that involve costs
payable to public agencies while requiring companies to have
specialized personnel for such work. Although it is difficult to
calculate these costs in order to add them to the actual tariff
as would be desired, it ~ is reasonable to assume that actual
tariffs are underestimated.
Table 2 shows the frequency and coverage of NTBs, specifying
commodities by NBM item and the value of controlled imports for
1975-1984. The methodology adopted does not include restrictive
acts that indiscriminately affect every product, such as the
import quota for the Manaus Free Trade Area, the Law of the Na-
tional Similar, Data-processing Law, etc.
It is clear that the political intent to restrain imports in
Brazil through NTBs grew considerably during the period under
study. In 1975, the NTBs affected some 3.6 per cent of NBM prod-
ucts, while by 1984 this percentage climbed to 55.6 per cent. On
the other hand, the value of imports with NTBs increased only 5
per cent between 1975 and 1980, and in 1984 returned to the 1975
level. These results suggest that the effectiveness of controls
through NTBs does not depend on the scope of legislation.
In 1980 the intention to control imports through NTBs was
particularly pronounced for tobacco products (89 per cent of NBM
items), plastics (69 per cent), textiles (65 per cent), food and
beverages (70 per cent). In 1984, items involving farming and
livestock, transport equipment, wood products and Pharmaceuticals
were added to this group. No decline in the government's inten-
tion to control imports with NTBs could be seen for any industry.
However, evidence shows that imports might have been rechanneled
into categories free of NTBs, or perhaps importable products
under NTBs already had sufficient internal supply and required
this control mechanism to a lesser extent.
It is interesting to observe that the rank correlation be-
tween the frequency indexes {NBM items with NTBs) for 1980 and
1984 is not statistically significant, suggesting an extremely
diversified use of this instrument. However, the correlation
between coverage indexes for the same period is 83.4 per cent.13
Table 2 - Share of Total Imports (Value) and No. of Products




















































































































































































































* NTBs considered are only those that specify the product classified by the
NBM: Quota System, contingencies, reference price, minimum value, suspended
imports, prior authorization from a trade organization,technical barrier,
etc.
Source: Guimaraes et al. (1987).14
These results can be explained by the need to restrain imports
due to the foreign-exchange crisis. This was achieved by applying
NTBs to different degrees in each industry because this mechanism
was less transparent and did not hamper negotiations with the IMF
that were underway at the time (Silva and Horta, 1984).
2.5. Implicit Tariffs in 1985
Table 3 shows calculations of the nominal implicit tariffs
by industry as explained in Section 2.3. The figures for the
sectors within each industry are weighted by national output
values in order to express the nominal protection intended for
the domestic industrial structure. Results suggest that some
sectors are extremely competitive from the standpoint of supply,
since profitability in the international market is higher than in
the domestic market: wood products (implicit protection -18.0),
paper and board (-1.42), food (-30.84), beverage (-42.63), to-
bacco (-66.33) and printing (-14.24).
As the implicit nominal tariff incorporates the influence of
trade and industrial policies reflected in prices, it does not,
in itself, provide a basis for an analysis of the determinants of
international competitiveness. Nevertheless, industrial sectors
for which implicit tariffs are negative clearly need no conven-
tional protection against foreign competition, since their domes-
tic prices, converted by the exchange rate, are lower than those
in the international market. This is true even though many domes-
tic prices are maintained beneath the prevailing international
prices by government agencies.
The highest implicit nominal tariffs are for electrical and
communications equipment (41.4 per cent), Pharmaceuticals (30.9
per cent), rubber products (48.3 per cent), plastics (108.7 per
cent), textiles (34.9 per cent) clothing and footwear (62.0 per
cent), chemicals (38.0 per cent), and other industry (48.2 per
cent) .
We can also see that the protection of Brazilian industry
intended originally, as reflected by nominal legal tariffs (TAB)15




















































































































Manufacturing 9.99 60.69 50.70 25.19
Note: Averages are weighted by 1975 production values for the
industrial sectors belonging to each industry, from Braga
et al. (1987).
Source: Table Al.16
was higher than actual protection as measured by implicit
tariffs. Tariff redundancy, measured by the difference between
the legal and implicit tariff rates, is found for every good
except plastics. The greatest redundancies occur in traditional
sectors such as tobacco products (165.3 per cent), beverages
(140.0 per cent), food-(86.3 per cent), furniture (85.0 per
cent), perfumes and soap (85.9 per cent), and leather products
(76.0 per cent). These data illustrate the distorted nature of
the tariff structure for this year and suggest the need to
establish a proper balance between policies affecting the domes-
tic market and trade policy.
In Table 4 sectors have been grouped by category of use. When
tariff redundancy rates are ranked in order, we have consumer
goods (96.8 per cent), followed by capital goods (45.9 per cent)
and intermediate goods (38.9 per cent). Tariff redundancy is the
highest for the non-durable consumer goods category because the
tariff structure was created in 1957 with the idea of substi-
tuting imports of such goods. Although it has been constantly
changed, generally by adding surtaxes, tariff reductions through-
out the years have been sparse, and affected only few products.
There is a slight correlation between the sectoral rankings
in terms of legal and implicit tariffs (Spearman coefficient of
0.19). Although no conclusion can be drawn regarding to the ade-
quacy of implicit nominal tariffs for the current Brazilian in-
dustrial structure, from the standpoint of political rationality
the results indicate the need for greater integration between
domestic pricing and trade policies. Furthermore, it is recom-
mended that tariffs should be lowered without affecting implicit
protection, in order to bring the tariff structure into line with
current protection levels. This argument is reinforced by the
fact that transport cost rates are very high for certain indus-
trial goods. Although this variable that cannot easily controlled
by policy, awareness of it will nevertheless allow tariff rates
to be more accurately calibrated.
The method for calculating tariff redundancy is found in Wogart
and Marques (1984), and Kume and Patricio (1988). It consists
in the difference between implicit and legal tariffs.17
Table 4 - Nominal Protection and Tariff Redundancy by Category of








































Manufacturing 9.99 60.69 50.7
Averages weighted by the 1975 output value for sectors per-
taining to each item.
Source: Table Al.18
2.6 Effective Protection in Brazil - 1985 -
Effective protection is usually defined as the percentage
deviation of value added in a productive process under protection
from value added under free trade. Implicit effective protection
(G. .) can thus be expressed as follows:
T, , - la. . T.
impj
'imp;} ± 13 lmpi (6)
G. —
where a.. represents the technical coefficient of inputs under
free trade.
Estimates of effective protection by industry for 1985 are
shown in Table 5 (results at industrial core-sector level - 5-
digit FIBGE classification - are reported in Table A2). Effective
implicit protection was 8.12 per cent for manufacturing and
-14.81 per cent for agriculture and extractive industries. From
the viewpoint of foreign trade policy, strictly defined to cover
non-tariff barriers and tariffs, the results indicate a marked
gab between actual effective protection as calculated from im-
plicit tariffs and effective protection calculated from legal
tariffs. This reinforces the arguments by Tyler (1983) and Braga
et al. (1987) concerning the inappropriateness of using legal
tariff vectors to calculate effective protection.
Implicit effective protection is negative for nine indus-
tries. The most highly protected industries were plastics (490.5
per cent), clothing, footwear and woven goods (47.6 per cent),
rubber products (102,0 per cent) and electrical/communication
equipment (81.4 per cent).
The Spearman correlation coefficient between implicit and
legal effective protection is .153. This means that protectionist
measures together with domestic policies offer a profile of ef-
fective protection that differs from the underlying intentions of
tariff policy. On the other hand, Spearman rank correlation co-
efficients between nominal and effective rates of protection are
80.0 per cent and 82.2 per cent, respectively, for implicit and
legal tariffs. Hence nominal protection is a good indicator for
the prevailing incentives for resource allocation.19
Table 5 - Implicit and Legal Effective Protection by
Industry - 1985 (*) (per cent)









































































The policy of promoting manufactured exports was first im-
plemented in Brazil in the late 1960s and has resulted in some
rather diversified instruments and mechanisms. This is due to the
constant changes in foreign-trade policy, reflecting its adapta-
tion to current economic development strategy. Nowadays there are
some 25 promotional instruments and mechanisms for export promo-
tion, consisting essentially of duty and tax exemptions. Gener-
ally speaking, they can be grouped into tax breaks, financial
incentives, the drawback regime, and the BEFIEX system. The fol-
lowing sections give a summary of the workings of these incen-
tives and use the available data to quantify the incentive rates.
Lastly, the combined effect of protection and export promotion is
assessed as the basis of the anti-export bias for each industry.
3.2 The BEFIEX Program
Among the programs intended to spur Brazilian exports that
sprang up early in the 1970s BEFIEX has turned out to be one of
the most important - not only because of its concept and the
export incentives regulated by Decree Law 1219 (1972), but also
due to the irrevocable nature of the incentives granted. Under
the BEFIEX program companies commit themselves to achieving fixed
export targets (for a maximum term of 10 years) so as to obtain
import duty relief on imported inputs and machinery. The incen-
tive rules in effect for the entire export sector at the time of
the conclusion of the contract between the company and BEFIEX are
then applied throughout the life of the contract.
In this regard the lack of data affects the evaluation of in-
centives granted under the BEFIEX program. From the quantitative
standpoint, one has to add duty and tax exemptions on imports to
the export-incentive legislation in effect at the time the agree-
ment was made (IPI and ICM credit-premium, reduction of the basis
for calculating taxable profit obtained from exports, etc.).21
Table 6 shows estimated incentive rates solely for imports
under the BEFIEX program. These figures must be regarded with
caution not only because they do not include direct incentives to
the formation of export prices, but also because tax and duty-
exempt imports require export commitments of up to 10 years,
which limits the annual comparability of data. Table 6 shows that
the incentive rate (gross or net) dropped considerably during the
first half of the 1980s (a 55 per cent decline for the net rate
and 31.2 per cent for the gross rate). Although this fact is
important from the standpoint of quantifying export incentives,
it does not invalidate the notion that the incentives in the
BEFIEX system benefit essentially imports of capital goods and
raw materials.
Table 7 demonstrates that exports linked to the BEFIEX pro-
gram accounted for an increasing share of total manufactured
exports while the share of transport equipment in BEFIEX export
declined. The growing number of BEFIEX contracts initiated (Table
8) further reinforces the idea that duty exemptions for machinery
and raw material imports linked to BEFIEX are an additional
stimulus to the competitiveness Brazilian industry. At the sec-
toral level, when a company joins the BEFIEX program or expands
its activities within the program, it typically carries others
along in a chain reaction. Thus, of the 316 contracts signed by
manufacturing industry, 16 per cent (51 contracts) pertained to
transport equipment, mainly in the 1980s (37 contracts). An out-
standing position of the transport equipment industry is also
apparent from its consolidated balance sheet within BEFIEX (Table
9). It accounted for 60 per cent of cumulative exports under
BEFIEX in 1972-85, and 62 per cent of the program's trade
balance.
Although this evidence is descriptive, it reinforces the
belief that BEFIEX has spurred the expansion of Brazilian ex-
ports. The success enjoyed by the transport equipment industry
has been echoed by other industries, resulting in efficiency
gains for the companies involved. The advantage of this instru-
ment lies in the differentiated access to foreign machinery and
raw materials that can make Brazilian products more competitive.22
Table 6 - BEFIEX Program: Fee and Tax Exemptions & Export Incentive
Rate, 1980-1985 (US$ Million)
Manufactured exports Exemptions
Imports Total Linked Duty Taxes
Year BEFIEX to BEFIEX


































































Source: BEFIEX Executive Secretary and Secretariat of Federal Revenue
(Table A3).




Year Manufactured Total Transport in manu-
exports equipment factured
exports













































































Source: BEFIEX Executive Secretary; Table A7.23
Table 8 - Number of BEFIEX Contracts by Industry, 1972-1985
Industrial Good Year




Mechanical Equipment 1 1133 16 333 34
Electrical Equipment 1 1 1332251 19











Clothing, Footwear 112195 13 8 40




Other Industry 2 1 4 4 10 11 21 6 7 9 75
Manufacturing 2 3 3 4 11 5 10 16 35 35 79 25 44 44 316
Source: BEFIEX Executive Secretary and Baumann/Braga (1986).24



















































































































































































































Total 22 091.6 13 357.8 13 137.0 8 096.9 71.8 65.9 13.1 5.1 11.1 15.2
(*) Values in parenthesis are negative. -
 alinked to BEFIEX.
Source: BEFIEX Executive Secretary; Table A6.25
When the technological gap between Brazil and the rest of the
world is reduced (or widened), it is reasonable to assume that
the BEFIEX program will contribute less (or more) to Brazilian
exports. Import duty exemptions for goods committed to export
under BEFIEX management are a good example of a powerful stimulus
to modernizing the national productive structure while at the
same time improving the Brazilian trade balance.
3.3 Drawback Arrangement
The so-called 'drawback
1 arrangement offers the same com-
petitive conditions to Brazilian exporters as to their foreign
competitors. It is utilized by firms that require imported compo-
nents or raw materials for their exported products. Exports
stemming from drawback arrangements result in net earnings of
foreign currency, since the share of imported components in the
value of an exported product is limited to 30 per cent.
The drawback mechanism was in fact one of the first export
incentives available to the Brazilian export sector. It was
established through Law 3244 (Aug. 14, 1957), though it did not
go into effect until June 16, 1964, with Decree Law 57,964. Sub-
sequent changes in the law were significant, especially in regard
to commodity coverage.
Table 10 quantifies tax and duty exemptions and has been
prepared on the basis of two data sources. The first is the
Federal Revenue Service, whose records show the waiver of import
duty, excise tax (IPI) and the sales tax (ICM). The second is
Baumann and Moreira (1987) who, in addition to these incentives,
include in their global incentive rates the relief from the
Harbor Improvement Tax, the Surcharge Tax on Freight for the
Renovation of the Merchant Marine, handling fees, and the Finan-
cial Operations Tax.
The incentive rate granted by the drawback program during the
1980s remained reasonably stable at around 9.0 per cent, empha-
sizing the import role played by this program in export promo-
Operational and legislative aspects of the drawback arrangement
are described in Castro (1985).26
Table 10 - Drawback Regime: Tax and Duty Exemptions and Export











































83.06 441.67 1 117.10
97.07 287.94 1 056.00
850.33 562.94 103.03 267.88 969.70
979.78 601.71 104.76 560.29 1 337.00







(*) Calculations based on Baumann and Moreira (1987).
Source: Baumann and Moreira (1987); Foreign Trade Yearbook and Secretariat of
Federal Revenue (Table A3).27
tion. Statistics on exports carried out under the drawback
arrangement are available only for 1983 onwards. In 1984, draw-
back exports were approximately $ 5.538 billion, and $ 6.198
billion for 1985. A net gain of $ 4.327 billion in 1984 and $
4.756 in 1985 was achieved through this arrangement.
To acquire these net foreign exchange earnings required a
waiver of import duty (II), IPI, ICM and others. For 1984 and
1985, the figures in Table 10 show that incentives totaled
$ 1.337 billion and $ 1.078 billion, respectively, or 30 per cent
of net foreign exchange earnings. We may assume that these export
incentives were necessary in order to promote external adjust-
ment, to the detriment of public revenues.
3.4 Duty Exemption Based on Export Increases
Another type of export incentive consists of exemptions on
import duties and taxes based on a company's increase in exports.
Therefore, if in period t + 1 company exports are higher than in
period t, the firm may claim duty and tax exemptions for imports
that have been previously listed by the government. Judging by

































































CACEX began keeping a record of exports carried out under the
drawback arrangement only in mid-1983; for previous years,
exports figures refer to export licenses only.28
3.5 Financial Incentives
Incentives in the form of preferential credit to exporters
are currently very limited in the opinion of CACEX directors, who
are receiving few requests for this incentive. The first regula-
tion regarding this type of incentive was Central Bank Resolution
71 (1967), whereby any commercial bank could obtain funds from
monetary authorities at , real interest rates of 4 per cent per
annum for loans to the export sector while charging 8 per cent
annually. During the mid-1970s, the need to increase exports to
adjust the balance of payments led the government to increase fi-
nancial incentives. Later on, export subsidies had to be lowered
because of the stabilization plan adopted by agreement with the
IMF. Early in 1984, the subsidy implicit in the preferential
credit given to exporters was reduced through Resolution 882/883,
which replaced Resolutions 674/643. The real interest rate
charged to exporters on this credit line returned to a positive
value (interest rate of 3 per cent p.a. plus monetary correc-
tion) .
In August 1984 Resolution 950 substantially altered the
financing system for exporters. Ever since 1967 financing had
come from monetary authorities at pre-set rates. With this Reso-
lution, financing began to involve commercial bank funds, with
monetary authorities passing on the amount needed to equalize any
differential between interest rates, which was initially estima-
ted to be as much as 15 per cent of debt adjusted for monetary
correction. In addition to these instruments there was the so-
called Cic-Crege 11. Under an arrangement similar to 882, it
envisioned variable interest rates on loans ranging from 3-7 per
cent, depending on the size of the company, and indexation of the
debt.
This instrument was subsequently changed by Resolution 622,
and in 1986 became part of regional development strategy. Ex-
porting firms located outside the regions covered by the Super-
intendencies for the Development of the Northeast and the Amazon
(SUDENE and SUDAM) could obtain a rebate of up to 12 per cent on
bank loans, while for these regions an 18 per cent rebate was
provided, similar to Cic-Crege 11.29
From the standpoint of quantifying incentives based on pre-
ferential credit lines for exports during the first half of the
1980s, the results by Baumann and Moreira (1987) are quite com-
prehensive. They have the additional advantage of including a
breakdown of post- and pre-shipment credit for exported goods. It
is reasonable to assume that the effects of pre-shipment financ-
ing weigh more heavily on export performance because financing
for production of exportable goods exercises a greater influence
on the composition of exports than resources intended for mar-
keting goods already produced.
Table 12 is self-explanatory; however, note should be taken
of the sharp reduction in incentive rates for export financing
beginning in 1982, caused by the scarcity of public funds. Pre-
shipment financial incentives after December 1976 (Res. 398)
ranged from 5-30 per cent of the value of products exported the
year before, as previously listed. This system is still in force,
and the list of products covered has remained essentially the
same. By way of example, in 1984 the number of products dropped
from 9,672 to 9,660 items as classified by NBM because Resolution
674 was replaced by No. 882.
The study by Baumann and Braga (1986) deals with financing
amounts per NBM section under Resolution 674/882, 1983. The
findings of Baumann and Moreira (1987) show that the main finan-
cial incentive in 1985 was provided by Resolution 950, whose
commodity coverage is similar to Resolution 882. Based on these
studies, we have adjusted these results for 1985 in order to
calculate the financial incentive rate by industry, after making
the NBM product classification compatible with the FIBGE classi-
fication of industrial goods. 1983 financing figures are used for
calculating the incentive rate in 1985 because until 1984 finan-
cing control data were filed in the Central Bank of Brazil, while
as of that date control management was shifted to CACEX at the
Banco do Brasil which does not have computerized data available
to the public. Table A5 shows estimated financial incentive rates
by industry. The basic assumption is that for total exports
during the two years in question there has been no change in the
share of financing, which is feasible in light of the relative30




































































Financing for warehousing, exports on trade consignment abroad for project
sales, marketing, direct financing to exporter, and equalization of external
interest rates. - Financing of working capital (Res. no. 674/882 Cic-Crege
14-11, Concex Res. 68, CMN Res. 950), financing of trading companies (Res.
no. 643/883), financing of foreign investments, and financing for project
preparation.
Source: Baumann & Moreira (1987); Foreign Trade Yearbook - CACEX, Exports;
Secretariat of Federal Revenue.
stability of commodity coverage. Goods for which incentive rates
were high in 1983/85 are furniture (3.87 per cent), Pharmaceuti-
cals (4.87 per cent), perfumes and soap (5.5 per cent), plastics
(15.14 per cent), clothing, footwear and textiles (4.67 per
cent) .
3.6 Fiscal Incentives
Initially tax breaks consisted of reductions in the excise
tax (IPI) as stipulated by Decree Law 61,514 (1967), and in the
sales tax (ICM) for exported goods, Decree Law 496 (1968). In
Under the system prior to the tax reform, these taxes actually
produced a snowball effect because they were applicable to the
sales price, with a tax exemption only for exported goods. With
the reform, taxes were applied to value added, a more rational
approach to export promotion.31
addition, the tax rates on profits resulting from export opera-
tions were lower than those applied to normal company profits
(Decree Law 56,965; 1965). Nevertheless, judging from the results
of Braga (1980) and Baumann and Moreira (1987) none of these
incentives had a substantial impact.
One of the most important tax breaks for exports in Brazil
was the IPI and ICM tax credit (credito premio) instituted in
January 1970. Its maximum value was the IPI tax rate, up to a
maximum of 15 per cent of FOB export value. In 1979 the rates for
the IPI and ICM tax credits were unified. In December 1979 the
IPI tax credit was eliminated, following the maxi-devaluation of
the Cruzeiro (30 per cent against the dollar). In April 1981 the
tax credit was reinstated with uniform benefits for almost all
products. Reductions in the applicability of the tax credit were
implemented until it was finally eliminated in May 1985.
Table 13 shows the values of IPI and ICM tax credits as
well as those specified in Decree Law 59,965 concerning the re-
duction of the income tax on export profit. The latter equals the
value of the tax on real profits, multiplied by the tax-exempt
portion of export profits. Alternatively the tax rate on taxable
profit may be considered in order to quantify the tax incentive
rate for exports (Tyler, 1983). Econometric estimates, however,
show that real profit is preferable to taxable profit in view of
the importance of the former to export performance (Guimaraes,
1985). These data were taken from the Corporate Income Tax Year-
book of the Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately, the latest avail-
able edition of this yearbook pertains to 1983; we have therefore
not shown fiscal incentives for 1984 and 1985.
At present, the IPI and ICM tax credit for exports is in force
only for companies with export commitments made under the
BEFIEX system before May 1985. Decree Law 59,965 has recently
been reformulated (end of 1987). The reduction of the non-
taxable portion of export profits currently represents only 3
per cent. Exports linked to BEFIEX programs are also excluded,
and the lower tax rates on export profit that were in force at
the beginning of the program prevail.32
Table 13 - Export Incentive Rates: IPI/ICM Tax Credit and















































a • b • c
Values sampled. - Data unavailable. - Includes 'credito
premio' incentive only.
Source: Foreign Trade Yearbook - CACEX; IPI Purchasing and
Sales, Secretariat of Federal Revenue, Ministry of
Finance; Table A4.
The IPI and ICM tax credit also comes from this publication
for 1980 and 1981. For subsequent years, the Federal Revenue
Service has regularly included this information in its publica-
tion IPI Purchasing and Sales, which we have used to compile
(Table 13). Data available in these publications refer to manu-
factured exports, and the incentive rates therefore relate to
these overall values.
Annual estimates of tax incentive rates for 1980-1985 show
the political intent to gradually phase out the IPI credit-
premium beginning in 1982, with this incentive ending in May
1985. Income tax reduction as a means of spurring Brazilian ex-
ports never accounted for more than 2 per cent of the value of
manufactured exports in any of these years.33
3.7 Government Incentives and the Anti- (Pro-) Export Bias of
Trade Policy
A policy for controlling imports work against an export
strategy if it makes importable raw materials protected by duties
and non-tariff barriers more expensive than freely traded goods.
In spite of a negative effect on export performance individual
firms, of course, may still successfully compete in the domestic
market with a cost structure higher than that in the external
market. To offset this negative effect on exports caused by pro-
tection exporting companies may be granted access to raw materi-
als at international prices. In Brazil, various export incentive
schemes are intended to maintain the protection necessary for
import substitution without harming the profitability of exports.
Other export incentives may help to lessen the anti-export bias
caused by protection, such as financial and tax incentives. Only
when the rate of incentives offered to exporters exceeds the
level of protection given to domestic industry through import
control does trade policy become biased in favour of exports.
Table 14 reports the anti-export bias by industry for the
year 1985. For all manufacturing tax and financial incentives as
a percentage of export value amounted to 8.32 per cent in 1985.
Particularly low rates are found for non-metallic minerals (2.22
per cent), tobacco products (2.11 per cent), food (3.40 per cent)
printing (3.40 per cent), and chemicals (2.26 per cent). In order
to evaluate trade policy, column 4 in Table 14 repeats the
estimates of implicit nominal protection previously made, while
column 5 calculates the anti-export bias. For nine industries (20
per cent of total exports in 1985) trade policy was favorable to
exports (negative anti-export bias or pro-export bias). For the
remaining industries trade policy favored internal sales (posi-
tive anti-export bias). Although these results do not compare
exactly with those for 1980-1981 reported by Tyler (1983) and
Fasano Filho et al. (1987), who utilized a different methodology
for gathering international prices, they show a similar level of
implicit protection (implicit tariff of 11.9 per cent for all
manufacturing in 1980/81 and 11.4 per cent in 1985) as well as a
pronounced decline in nominal export incentives (manufacturing34


































































































































































































































Export incentive rates have been calculated by the conventional method of
the ratio of incentives to export value. The credit-premium value has been
obtained from "Purchase and Sales Movement" (Min. of Finance, Sec. of Fed.
Rev.). The incentive rate resulting from income-tax reduction has been cal-
culated by the average from previous years (1981-1982-1983). For financial
incentives, the percentages of exports financed are those that prevailed in
1983 (Baumann, 1986J, multiplied by the interest reduction rate applied to
exports in 1985. - Data weighted by 1985 exports.35
average of 20.8 per cent in 1980, 19.3 per cent in 1981, and 8.3
per cent in 1985). Accordingly, the nominal anti-export bias rose
from -8.9 per cent in 1980 to 3.0 per cent in 1985, mainly due to
reduced export incentives. These results reinforce the notion
that during the first half of the 1980s economic policy for the
manufacturing sector as a- whole pursued a more or less neutral
course regarding the internal vs. the export market, which is
desirable from a regulatory standpoint.
In the analysis of trade policy, export promotion and domes-
tic market protection are often adjusted for the difference be-
tween the official and the social rate of exchange. On the other
hand, to estimate the social rate of exchange requires extremely
strong assumptions that are difficult to verify empirically.
Recent studies generally assume a given reference period during
which the social rate of exchange is equal to the nominal rate.
In Brazil, the period used has been December 1979, after the
maxidevaluation of the Cruzeiro (for example, cf. Moldau and
Pelin, 1986). To update the social exchange rate, these methods
usually require that a) there are no alterations in the terms of
trade during the period under study, and b) the real income dif-
ferential between the country under consideration and the rest of
the world remains constant. Given these very strong assumptions,
and considering that in 1985 the balance of payments current
account balance was almost zero, we assume that the social rate
of exchange was quite close to the official rate, in which case
our estimates do not require adjustment.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of nominal and effective protection of manu-
facturing industry in Brazil has focused on implicit protection,
This argument is also backed up by the technical-political ra-
tionale of the Cruzado Plan implemented in Brazil in February
1986, which gave priority to a price freeze so as to bring the
inflationary process to a halt with no prior altering of the
exchange rate, reinforcing the idea that it was probably in
equilibrium.36
i.e. has been based on a comparison of domestic and international
prices. This was necessary in view of the great diversity of
trade policy instruments and industrial policy measures utilized
to favour specific sectors. This focus has made it possible to
obtain extremely useful results from the point of view of policy
recommendations.
The data show the existence of widespread tariff redundancy.
Legal tariff redundancy in 1985 for all manufacturing was 50.7
per cent, while nominal implicit tariff (the increase in domestic
relative to international prices) amounted to 10.0 per cent.
These results also show that great care must be taken when con-
sidering the effects of protectionism solely on the basis of
legal tariff, as is traditionally done not only because rates of
non-tariff barriers but mainly because of extensive tariff
redundancy. Knowledge of implicit protection, and hence of the
impact of industrial policy on the level of protection therefore
permits a more rational appraisal of the structure of protection.
The quantification of the two main export incentives in
Brazil has established the predominance of the drawback regime in
absolute figures (with tax and duty exemption equivalent to 30
per cent of the net foreign-exchange balance). BEFIEX, in turn,
showed a net foreign-exchange gain of more than 80 per cent of
export value for 1985, with incentives equivalent to only 12 per
cent of the net foreign-exchange balance. Export incentives were
considerably curtailed during the first half of the 1980s. How-
ever, this fact created no major problems for the Brazilian
export sector, given that exports grew considerably during the
period. This study therefore points to the need to efficiently
widen the base of exportable products to improve export
performance.
The anti-export bias of the incentive structure for all
manufacturing in 1985 was rather modest (3 per cent). However,
the figures for individual indsutries varied widely. Hence trade
policy in 1985 discriminated significantly between industries but
maintained a more or less neutral stance at the aggregate level
with respect to incentives for domestic vs. export sales.37'
Table Al - Nominal Protection Vectors - 1985
Classification
Implicit Legal Tariff Transport
Tariff Tariff Redundancy Cost
















































































































































































































































































10.0contin. Table Al -
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Classification
Implicit Legal Tariff Transport
Tariff Tariff Redundancy Cost
(1) (2) (3)=(2)-(l) (4)
Mfg. Automobile
Mfg. Bus & Truck











Mfg. Tires & Inner Tubes







Mfg. Elastic Fiber Resin
Mfg. Raw Vegetable Oil



















































































































































































































40.0contin. Table Al -
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Classification
Implicit Legal Tariff Transport
Tariff Tariff Redundancy Cost




















































48.1 95.0 46.9 24.0
Source: International Prices: IPEA/FUNCEX Data Bank, 1987; Bra-
zilian Customs Duties, 1985,Import Yearbook, 1985; NBM-
FIBGE Compatibility, IPEA-FUNCEX, 1986.40








































































































































































Other Non-metallic Min. Prods
Mfg. Pig Iron





Mfg. of Drawn Shapes
Mfg. of Fitted Steel Struc.
Mfg. Stamped Metal
Mfg. Metal Packing
Mfg. Other Metal Prods.
Mfg. Pumps and Motors
Mfg. Machinery Ace. Parts
Mfg. Turbines & Boilers
Mfg. Industrial Mach.
Mfg. Farm Machinery
Mfg. Tract. & Highway Mach.
Mfg. Office Equipment
Inst. & Mach. Repair
Mfg. Elec. Power Equip.
Mfg. Elec. Conductors
Mfg. Elec. Equipment
Mfg. Vehicle Elec. Equip.
Mfg. Elec. Equip. Motors
Mfg. Electronic Equip.
























































































































































Mfg. Bus & Truck











Mfg. Tires & Inner Tubes







Mfg. Elastic Fiber Resin
Mfg. Raw Vegetable Oil



















Process. Other Veg. Prods.
Slaughtering/Meat Prep.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Ministry of Finance, Secretariat of Federal Revenue.44
Table A4 - Income Tax Rates on Actual Profits and Export Profits, 1979-1983
Industrial Good Income tax base rate (%) Export profit (US$ millions)






























































































































































































































































Source: Corporation Yearbooks, Ministry of Finance.45
Table A5 - 1985 Estimated Incentive Rate, Resolution 882-95
Item - FIBGE




























































































































* Estimated exchange rate: Buy-sell average, Dec. 1983 = 580.199
** Subsidy rate corresponds to formula by Baumann & Camargo (1987), assuming
that the value financed in 1983 is same for 1985.
SV =
im - i Value of financing
*
1 + im Manuf. exports
im = market interest rate
i = subsidized int. rates
Source: Baumann & Moreira (1987); Baumann & Braga (1986); Trade Balance and
Other Current Indicators (1986), Expanded Edition, FUNCEX.46


















































































































































































Source: Secretariat of Federal Revenue and Purchase and Sales Movement, IPI,







B2 - t-fcrti. & Bguip.
B3 -Quota
B4 - Other Imp. Inaents.
B5 - Other
C. Trafe Balance (A-B)
D. Services (D1,D2,D3,D4,D5,D6)
Dl - Tteh. Assist.
D2 - Cotriss. & Correct.
D3 - Profits & Dividends
D4 - Interest
D5 - Insurance & Freight
DS - Other Ffenittances
E. Current Transactions (GtO)
F. Capital Nfcuerrmt (F1,F2,F3,F












































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Executive Secretariat of BEFIEX.48
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